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Preface 
 
I originally became interested in International Humanitarian Law before I ever even 
stepped foot outside the U.S. However, as a somewhat naïve college student, I was 
generally unaware that IHL consists of more than just mandates to provide humanitarian 
assistance to victims of violence. After visiting the ICRC, a new-founded interest began 
to take form, and the Law of Armed Conflict clearly became a subject of curiosity. In the 
present reality of the “War on Terror,” I increasingly became interested in the ways that 
armed conflict has changed since the start of the 21
st
 century, and in what ways parties to 
violent conflict find it difficult to abide by International Humanitarian Law. While there 
are a multitude of reasons why non-State actors should, but do not comply with 
humanitarian norms, I truly believe that it is the obligation of Western, “civilized” States 
to take responsibility for their own violations in order to more fully encourage 
compliance on behalf of all belligerents. Only if this is achieved—by denouncing 
inhumane practices in war such as counter-terrorist strategies that explicitly degrade 
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 The changing nature of warfare in the 21
st
 century poses a multitude of challenges to the 
perceived applicability of International Humanitarian Law for both State and non-State 
actors in contemporary conflicts. These issues, including but not limited to: ambiguity in 
the distinction of violent conflict, the changing type of actors involved, issues of 
asymmetric warfare, challenges of negative reciprocity, and an inhibited ability to engage 
with all parties to conflict, are detrimental to the overriding purpose of IHL. Still, the 
oftentimes inefficient nature of the international system, as well as lack of consensus 
regarding new legislation means that formal changes in IHL to more flexibly reflect the 
reality of situations will not be developed anytime in the near future. Therefore, it is in 
the best interest of all parties to non-international conflicts to aspire to better respect the 
existing norms of IHL, which can only be attained if States recognize the dire need for 
inclusive engagement with all types of non-State actors. In addition, practices of positive 
reciprocity must be carried out by all parties, in order to better serve the ultimate goal of 
International Humanitarian Law: the reduction of human suffering, and the preservation 
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I. Introduction 
In 2010, in his report to the United Nations Security Council on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, the Secretary-General stressed the need for “a comprehensive 
approach towards improving compliance with the law” by armed non-State actors, and 
stated that:  
Improved compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law 
will always remain a distant prospect in the absence of, and absent acceptance of 
the need for, systematic and consistent engagement with non-state armed groups. 
Whether engagement is sought with armed groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the occupied Palestinian territories, Pakistan, 
Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda, Yemen or elsewhere, experience shows that lives 
can be saved by engaging armed groups in order to seek compliance with 
international humanitarian law in their combat operations and general conduct, 





Yet in the context of modern warfare of the 21
st
 century, the practice of engaging non-
State actors to ensure more comprehensive compliance with International Humanitarian 
Law is often thwarted by the distorted perception that IHL cannot, or should not be 
applied in all situations of armed combat. But what is the reason for this phenomenon, 
and how can it be discontinued and further prevented? What are the real-life challenges to 
compliance with IHL in combat, and how can they be overcome?  
While the answer to these questions could no doubt fill hundreds of pages, it is the 
aim of this paper to outline some of the most foreboding threats to the effective practice 
of International Humanitarian Law in the current era, and stress the necessity for 
impartial engagement with the fastest growing type of belligerent in armed conflict: the 
non-State actor. In a period marked by the phenomenon of globalization, implications for 
                                                        
1
 ‘Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ 
(UN Security Council, UN doc. S/2010/579, November 2010), 11. 
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the practice and preservation of humanitarian norms are still unclear, and it is the duty of 
both States and non-State actors alike, to ensure that the Law of War is upheld in order to 
reduce the consequent result of widespread human suffering.  
The Existing Framework of International Humanitarian Law 
Most articulately stated, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the 
Law of Armed Conflict or the Law of War, “is the body of rules that, in wartime, protects 
persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities;” and seeks to limit 
the methods and means of warfare while preventing human suffering in times of armed 
conflict.
2
 The principle instruments of IHL are the four universally ratified Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 as well as the three Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005, as they 
stipulate that civilians and wounded or captured combatants must be treated in a humane 
manner.
3
 While the term jus ad bellum refers to the set of lawful criteria considered 
before engagement in war, jus in bello (IHL) is the law that governs the way in which 
warfare is conducted, irrespective of whether or not the cause of war is just. It works to 
humanize war, and protect civilians by creating distinctions between who and what may 
be targeted in conflicts, how this targeting is executed, weapons allowed, and the rights 
and obligations of combatant forces.
4
 In the laws of war, principles of distinction, 
proportionality, and necessary precaution for minimal effects on civilians are essential to 
the way in which armed forces may participate in combat.
5
 Accordingly, IHL focuses on 
                                                        
2
 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Discover the ICRC,” ICRC, 2005, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0790.pdf, 15. 
3
 Ibid.  
4
 Schmitt, Michael, "21st Century Conflict: Can the Law Survive?" Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 8 no. 2 (2007): 444. 
5
 Presentation given to students of SIT: Geneva, at ICRC, on Tuesday 26 February 2013, 
in Geneva.  
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governing how military operations may take place, instead of the legality for the reason 
of why they take place. In addition to formally adopted legislation of IHL, the rules of 
customary international humanitarian law are norms based on human rights that are 
considered to be binding even for states who have not officially ratified the Additional 
Protocols.
6
 Furthermore, IHL distinguishes between two types of armed conflict—
international armed conflicts (IACs) fought between at least two States, and non-
international armed conflicts (NIACs) that do not involve two States as opposing parties 
to the fighting—in order to extend its jurisdiction to as many instances as possible, so it 




Yet, in light of the changing conditions characterizing armed conflict in the 21
st
 
century, there exist many challenges to the proper application of IHL in the world today. 
Arguably, the perception of its irrelevance in contemporary conflicts for both State and 
non-State actors is the most significant obstacle to preserving its original objectives, and 
the subsequent lack of compliance—in any form—is undeniably detrimental to its 
overriding purpose. It is argued that recent developments in warfare, which change the 
nature of violent conflict, have led many to perceive IHL as non-applicable in the modern 
era. Issues concerning challenges to humanitarian intervention, while essential for 
providing relief to victims of war and natural disaster, are outside the scope of this paper. 
Instead, non-compliance by parties to the actual armed conflict due to perceived 
irrelevance, and subsequent practices of negative reciprocity are the most significant 
                                                        
6
 Mack, Michelle, "Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts," ICRC, Geneva, 2008, 9. 
7
 Instances of violence that do not cross the threshold of the definition of “armed 
conflict” are therefore not subject to IHL, but rather Human Rights and domestic law.   
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challenges for International Humanitarian Law and the jus in bello doctrine in 
contemporary warfare—representing a vicious cycle that is most detrimental to its 
underlying purpose of reducing human suffering. Finally, because of the lack of 
consensus in the international system regarding if, and/or how IHL should be revised to 
better reflect 21
st
 century conflict, this challenge can only be overcome by 1) an increased 
awareness of the beneficial incentives for abiding by existing IHL on the part of non-
State actors 2) the realization of the benefits of positive reciprocity by both States and 
non-State actors, and 3) increased willingness of States to engage in nonexclusive 
dialogue oh behalf of all parties involved. First, an explanation of why it is progressively 
difficult for IHL to effectively govern contemporary conflicts will be addressed. 
II. The Evolving Nature of Warfare 
Emerging Patterns 
It is not controversial to assert that warfare in the 21
st
 century is markedly 
distinctive from that of the early 20
th
 century. Following World War II, evident changes 
in the nature of war itself, transformations in both civilian and military technologies, and 
attitudes toward military occupation have converged to call into question the adequacy of 
existing international norms during an era marked by the rapid proliferation of violent 
internal armed conflicts.
8
 These localized conflicts, driven by transnational connections 
are a product of fourth generation warfare,
9
 and are propelled by the loss of the nation-
                                                        
8
  
Wippman, David. “Introduction: Do New Wars Call for New Laws?” In New Wars, New 
Laws?, edited by David Wippman and Mathew Evangelista, Ardsley, New York: 
Transnational Publishers, 2005, 1.  
9
 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, "Transnationality, War and the 
Law," A Report on a Roundtable on the Transformation of Warfare, International Law, 
and the Role of Transnational Armed Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2006, 7.  
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state’s monopoly on violence as well as the existence of “ad hoc warriors” in moral 
conflict.
10
 A transformation of the traditional concept of war indicates that conflict is no 
longer predominately characterized by a classical, state-centered paradigm in which 
battle is fought between soldiers as agents of the State,
11
 but rather by the ‘intermixing of 
other means’
12
 leading to complex and ambiguous situations of violence with less clear-
cut distinctions.  
In a Report for the 31
st
 Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, the ICRC 
outlines various evolving characteristics of warfare that illustrate these recent 
developments—all of which, have contributed to the fact that civilians continue to remain 
the primary victims of violations of IHL in armed conflicts.
13
 First, there are more 
frequently cases of low-intensity conflict in which a weakened state has “left room for 
local militias and armed groups to operate, leading to environments where looting and 
trafficking, extortion and kidnapping have become profitable economic strategies 
sustained by violence and national, regional and international interests.”
14
 Second, 
instances of extraterritorial military interventions and new forms of foreign military 
presence in the territory of a state have caused a refocused attentiveness to the law of 
occupation as it relates to IHL.
15
 Obvious illustrations include the occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21
st
 century, as well as ongoing 
                                                        
10
 “4GW—Fourth Generation Warfare,” May 2004, 
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/4gw_fourth_gene.html 
11
 Program on Humanitarian Policy, “Transnationality, War and Law,” 5 
12
 Ibid., 4 
13
 Violations such as murder, forced disappearance, torture, cruel treatment, outrages 
upon personal dignity, acts of sexual violence, abuses of protective emblems, and 
insecurity in the field all contribute to continued suffering, ICRC. 
14
 International Committee of the Red Cross, "International Humanitarian Law and the 
challenges of contemporary armed conflicts," ICRC, 31IC/11/5.1.2, Geneva, 2011, 6 
15
 ICRC, “"International Humanitarian Law and Challenges,” 26. 
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occupations such as the Gaza Strip by Israel. Third, the impact of emerging 
technologies—specifically advances in cyber capabilities, and thus, the threat of cyber 
attack as a means for warfare—has proven to be an imminent threat and will undoubtedly 
have major implications for the future of applicable humanitarian laws. Whether they be 
denial-of-service attacks on an entire population, as evidenced by the 2008 cyber attacks 
on Georgia, or unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the “drones” used by the United States 
military, humanitarian laws created in the 1900s do not entirely reflect the reality of 
technology in the 21
st
 century. Another notable trend is the blurring of the lines of 
distinction between ideological and non-ideological confrontations, with non-state armed 
groups arising from organized criminal activity.
16
 Instances of civil unrest rising to the 
level of armed conflict is demonstrated by situations in North Africa and the Middle East, 
such as in Libya where opposing government forces have organized to form opposition 
movements.
17
 Furthermore, the existence of transnational networks
18
 and multinational 
conflict is enabled by the evolution of globalization in the 21
st
 century; and a heightened 
focus on the importance of information intelligence in a world that revolves around 
complex communication and information systems such as the Internet, is undeniably key 
to the development of modern warfare. Thus, in recent years, advances in technology, 
globalization, and the proliferation of internal conflicts are all contributors to an 
increasingly complex international system in which IHL created during the post-WWII 
era, was not originally intended to operate. But while it is important to recognize these 
occurrences affecting modes of modern war, it is equally as essential to refrain from 
                                                        
16
 Ibid., 6 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Such as terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda 
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drawing overgeneralizations about these “new wars” when it comes to the application and 
implementation of International Humanitarian Law.
19
  
The Predominance of Non-International Conflicts 
Today, most armed conflicts are qualified as being of a non-international 
character for the purpose of classification under IHL,
20
 and in 2009, the Stockholm 
International Peace Reseach Institute determined that 17 ‘major’ armed conflicts were all 
intra-state in nature.
21
 Additionally, particularly in the last decade there has been an 
emergence of “multinational NIACs” in which two or more national forces may be 
fighting together against one or more organized group within the territory of the host 
state.
22
 France intervention in Mali starting in January 2013 is perhaps the most recent 
example of a multinational but non-international conflict, confirming this recently 
recurring pattern. 
According to existing IHL, in the event of a non-international conflict, Article 3 
common to the four Conventions called a “treaty in miniature” by the ICRC, and Protocol 
II should be applied. Article 3 requires that each party to the conflict shall apply 
minimum humanitarian provisions prohibiting violence against, taking hostages of, and 
executions of, any person taking no active part in the hostilities.
23
 In addition it calls for 
the care of the wounded and sick without any distinction founded on race, color, religion 
                                                        
19
 The idea that “New Wars” require “New Laws” is rejected in this paper, rather the idea 
is presented that “New Wars” pose challenges to IHL, which must be overcome by 
suppressing the notion that it is now obsolete. 
20
 Bellal, Annyssa, and Stuart Casey-Malsen. "Enhancing Compliance with International 
Law by Armed Non-State Actors ." Goettingen Journal of International Law 3 (2011), 2. 
21
 L. Harbon & P. Wallensteen, ‘Appendix 2A. Patterns of major armed conflicts, 2000–
2009’, SIPRI Yearbook 2010, SIPRI, Stockholm, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/02/02A  
22
 ICRC, “"International Humanitarian Law and Challenges,” 10. 
23
 International Committee of the Red Cross, “International Humanitarian Law: Answers 
to Your Questions,” Geneva, 2004, Www.icrc.org. ICRC, Oct. 2002, 19. 
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or faith, sex, wealth, or similar criteria; and the allowance of an impartial humanitarian 
body, such as the ICRC, to offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
24
  
Yet whilst these mandates provide clear obligations and protections for the Parties 
in theory, the reality of conflict is much less straightforward, and it must be understood 
that non-international armed conflicts are generally less easily discernable than 
international armed conflicts. Though Additional Protocol II aims to strengthen the 
protection of victims in these instances,
25
 “the treaty rules applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts are, in fact, rudimentary compared to those applicable in international 
armed conflicts. Not only are there fewer of these treaty rules, but thy are also less 
detailed and, in the case of Additional Protocol II, their application is dependent on the 
specific situation.”
26
 Furthermore, as one of the stipulations required for a conflict to be 
considered a NIAC under Article 3 is the fact that the violence must “reach a certain level 
of intensity,”
27
 IHL does not apply in instances of internal violence that amount to 
situations of “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts 
of violence and other acts of a similar nature.”
28
 Therefore, the applicability of IHL as it 
relates to internal conflict is the core of many ongoing debates about the overall 
effectiveness of its authority today. An instance where the applicability of IHL was called 
into question is manifested in the case of Mali. Originally, the level of intensity of the 
                                                        
24
 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Answers to your Questions,” 19.  
25
 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Discover the ICRC,” 16. 
26
 Mack, Michelle, "Increasing Respect,” 9, 10. 
27
 “Intensity” indicative factors as assessed by international jurisprudence include the 
number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations, the type of weapons used, 
the number of persons involved and munitions fired, types of forces partaking in the 
fighting, the number of casualties, extent of destruction, and number of civilians fleeing 
combat zones, ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law and Challenges,” 8-9.  
28
 Additional Protocol II, Article I, paragraph 2.  
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conflict was unclear, and the international community was faced with the decision of 
applying either IHL (if in fact it qualified as an armed conflict) or Human Rights Law (if 
it was to be considered merely internal violence).
29
 This legal dilemma illustrates the 
increasing difficulty in classifying armed violence for the purposes of IHL, and it is 
argued by some scholars that the very term “armed conflict” is insufficient for the 
purpose of regulating much of the internal violence today.
30
 
Taking into account developing complexities in war, combined with the fact that 
humanitarian norms are less stringently and explicitly applicable to the most common 
type of conflict experienced today (NIACs), the obvious reaction is that IHL is rendering 
less and less relevant in instances of contemporary violence. This perspective, however, 
is inaccurate, and is in and of itself one of the major problems contributing to violations 
of humanitarian norms, and consequently to the successful application of IHL.  
The Prevalence of Non-State Actors 
While the very nature of 21
st
 century warfare has arguably undergone significant 
developments in recent years, it is widely noted that non-State actors actively play an 
increasingly substantial role in contemporary violent conflicts.
31
 Although it is important 
to recognize the fact that armed non-State actors have been fighting against States 
throughout history, in previous eras, they more easily fit within the parameters of 
                                                        
29
 Interview conducted with Marina Mattirolo, Researcher at the Geneva Academy of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, on Wednesday 8 May 2013 in 
Geneva. 
30
 Sassoli, Marco, "The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and 
Inherent Challenges," Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 10 (December 2007), 
64.  
31
 Veuthey, Michel. “Implementing International Humanitarian Law: Old and New 
Ways” in: RAMCHARAN, Bertrand G. (Ed.) Human Rights Protection in the Field. 
Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006, 23. 
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domestic law enforcement.
32
 As the nature of war evolves due to the phenomenon of 
globalization, so too does the nature of pertinent actors exerting influence, and 
subsequently their role as agents to armed conflict around the world.  
The spectrum of new types of non-state actors is broad, “encompassing a range of 
identities, motivations and varying degrees of willingness and ability, to observe IHL and 
other international law standards.”
33
 Various sorts of non-State actors include groups 
classified as: organized armed groups, transnational corporations, private military and 
security companies, paramilitary forces, urban gangs, militias and the huge variety of 
transnational criminal entities—including so-called “terrorist” groups and pirates.
34
 In 
defining non-State actors it is also important to differentiate between armed non-State 
groups that use force as a means for furthering a political objective,
35
 and non-violent 
non-State actors that could simply be NGOs, international organizations, or corporations. 
While there are many definitions for differing terms such as: violent non-State actor, 
armed non-State actor (ANSA), non-State actor (NSA), armed non-State group, etc., for 




                                                        
32
 Program on Humanitarian Policy, “Transnationality, War and Law,” 7. 
33
 C Australian Red Cross, "The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century," 
International Humanitarian Law Magazine. 2012, 
http://www.redcross.org.au/files/IHL_Magazine_Issue_1_2012.pdf, 4. 
34
 Ibid., 4 
35
 DCAF, Geneva Call, "Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends & Future Challenges," 




 These terms all refer to a violent group not belonging to State military forces that take 
up arms against an opposing force or population in order to further a military, political, 
religious, or ideological objective 
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In addition, the characteristics of violent non-State groups are wide-ranging. Their 
members may include men, women and children who are recruited either forcefully or 
voluntarily, they may or may not effectively exert control over a physical territory, 
operate internationally or nationally, have ranging degrees of political motivation, use 
varying tactics such as guerrilla warfare in rural areas or urban violence against civilian 
populations, and rely on varying levels of resources.
37
 In spite of their diversity, violent 
non-State actors generally operate in the “illegitimate” sphere for purposes of domestic 
law,
38
 and are largely considered illegal and clandestine. Regardless of their 
characteristics, they are capable of endangering the lives of communities by “hindering 
humanitarian aid, planting landmines, recruiting and using child soldiers, and by 
trafficking and misusing small arms and light weapons”
39
 Additionally, their existence 
and contribution to non-international armed conflict often goes unacknowledged by the 
States under whose territory they operate.  
In a Report conducted by Harvard University, it was determined that new 
transnational non-State groups are characterized primarily by their statelessness, 
emancipation, privatization, and asymmetric position towards states, and ultimately “are 
problematic because they are irregular, difficult to respond to, and generally 
unrecognized by the long-standing laws of war.”
40
 The difficulties these emerging types 
of actors present to the application and compliance of IHL is wide-ranging. Under Article 
3, the second condition for the regulation of a NIAC is the existence of “Parties,” which 
                                                        
37
 DCAF, Geneva Call, "Armed Non-State Actors,” 5-10. 
38




 Program on Humanitarian Policy, “Transnationality, War and Law,” 10. 
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“must demonstrate a certain level of organization.”
41
 Accordingly, regardless of the level 
of violence, for any non-international conflict to function as such under IHL, both parties 
(whether a state fighting a non-state actor, or two non-state actors fighting each other) 
must meet these criteria. Yet, groups that fall outside this classification like gangs, 
paramilitary forces, crime groups and vigilantes still pose a challenge to the respect for 
humanitarian norms in violent conflict. An instance where the “organization” threshold 
was called into question was in the case of Syria, illustrating that along with the 
“intensity” factor of the conflict, the level of a group’s organization also contributes to 
ambiguity for the legal definition of armed conflict under IHL.
42
  
While there is no question that International Humanitarian Law does in fact 
regulate the actions of non-State actors in armed conflicts, the fact that non-State actors 
are more influential than ever only serves to illustrate the necessity for the better 
application, implementation and compliance with IHL in contemporary times. It is 
precisely for this reason that in a period largely characterized by ongoing non-
international armed conflicts wherein non-State groups make up at least half of all 
belligerents,
43
 the importance of IHL as it applies to these situations must be actively 
clarified and more accurately applied and enforced in order to uphold its original 
objective. Thus, as shaped by these evolving patterns in warfare, predominance of non-
international armed conflict, and increasing emergence of non-State actors—in the 
                                                        
41
 “Organization” indicators developed by the international jurisprudence may include the 
existence of a command structure, disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the armed 
group, the ability to obtain, transport or distribute arms, ability to plan, coordinate and 
carry out military operations, the existence of headquarters, the ability to negotiate and 
conclude agreement such as peace accords, etc. ICRC, "International Humanitarian Law 
and Challenges,” 8. 
42 Interview, Marina Mattirolo.  
43
 Bellal, Annyssa, and Stuart Casey-Malsen, "Enhancing Compliance,” 4. 
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contemporary legal, political, and concrete reality of International Humanitarian Law, 
there exists a multitude of specific conditions that cause both non-State actors as well as 
States to disregard their obligation of compliance during periods of armed conflict. 
III. Challenges to IHL in the Context of Contemporary Conflicts  
While there are far too many issues to specifically address for the purpose of this 
paper, one useful outline for understanding the challenges that face non-State actors in 
complying with IHL is drafted by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights. It categorizes the factors into five main groups, including: 1) 
strategic military concerns, 2) likelihood of prosecution under domestic law, 3) lack of 
knowledge of international norms, 4) ideology as a cause for deliberate violation, 5) a 
lack of “ownership” over international norms.
44
 While external incentives, both negative 
and positive such as ideology certainly affect compliance with IHL, in the following 
sections the main focus will be on reasons that involve both State and non-State groups in 
the interplay of norms and reactions leading to humanitarian violations.  
Non-State Actors: Bound Without Consent or Opportunity for Participation  
 It is perhaps readily apparent that one of the most prominent challenges to the 
effectiveness of International Humanitarian Law is the issue of non-compliance by the 
multitude of non-state actors formerly mentioned. But analogous to this problem is the 
fact that non-State actors are not autonomously or voluntarily Party to the treaties and 
conventions under which they are legally bound. Instead, IHL as ratified by States around 
the world includes the definitions of, and stipulations for NSAs in times of armed conflict 
                                                        
44 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Rules of 
Engagement: Protecting Civilians Through Dialogue with Armed Non-State Actors, 
October 2011, http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/Policy%20studies/Rules-of-Engagement-EN.pdf 5-6. 
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simply because they are de facto parties to the conflict. The theory referred to as the 
‘principle of legislative jurisdiction’ is a majority view of the international community, 
holding that non-state actors are bound under IHL by reason of their being active on the 
territory of a Contracting Party (a State Party to the Geneva Conventions and/or its 
Additional Protocols).
45
 But without their participation in the creation of these laws, and 
even oftentimes without their knowledge of them, it is difficult to expect comprehensive 
compliance, and ironically, “there are no groups that feel less represented by the State 
than armed opposition groups.”
46
 Aside from a contradiction regarding the treatment of 
NSAs in domestic law versus IHL, the mere fact that non-State actors are not privy to the 
international laws governing them does little to ensure that they will abide by their 
standards. Thus, arguably at the heart of this issue is the denial of consent and 
participation in rule making. In addition, the argument of IHL’s inherent “legitimacy” has 
little substance from the perspective of non-State actors, and “willingness to comply on 
the part of an actor is crucially dependent on the perception of its having consented to, or 
at least having participated in the formation of the law one is bound by.”
47
 As such, in a 
period when violent non-State actors increasingly exert influence in modern warfare, the 
reality that only States are party to the treaties of IHL is a negative factor hindering 
effective compliance.  
Asymmetric Warfare 
As illustrated, in recent years a number of overarching patterns have been 
                                                        
45
 Ryngaert, Cedric, “Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law,” Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven Faculty of Law, Nstituut Voor Internationaal Recht, K.U. Leuven, 
2008, 5 
46
 Ryngaert, Cedric. “Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Law,” 5. 
47
 Ibid., 8 
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observed. Namely, findings show an increase in the diversity of situations of armed 
conflict, ranging from conditions utilizing the most advanced technology and weapons 
systems by sophisticated government militaries (for example, the US) in asymmetric 
warfare, to instances characterized by low technology and a high degree of fragmentation 
of parties to the conflict.
48
  
In considering the major progressions of warfare, it is concluded that paramount 
to the challenge they pose is their contribution to the notion of asymmetry in warfare—a 
reality central to the difficulty of compliance for both State and non-State actors. While it 
is recognized that the obvious preference in warfare is to be on the stronger side of an 
asymmetric conflict in order to prevail, modern technology has given wealthy State 
militaries an extraordinary advantage in combat—a reality that largely undermines 
compliance with IHL.
49
 It is noted that the more asymmetric a conflict is, the more 
difficulties arise for implementation of IHL and for humanitarian action, as both sides are 
convinced that they must violate or at least ‘reinterpret’ IHL to suit their needs.
50
 In a 
case where a major, technologically capable, and organized militaristic state power is 
fighting a loosely organized militant rebel group, most rules are in practice largely 
addressed to only one side
51
 (The militaristically advantaged side most likely to win).
52
 
Politically driven conflicts may incite violence against groups other than the military 
enemy, and the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict often lacks the “necessary 
structures of authority, hierarchy, communication between superiors and subordinates 
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and process of accountability, all of which are necessary […] to enforce IHL or any other 
rules.”
53
 Violations of IHL are often perceived as necessary for less sophisticated non-
State armed groups because they have neither the incentive, nor the capability to “fairly” 
defeat the stronger enemy State (as evidenced in combat in the Middle East); conversely 
they are perceived as necessary for the State as the only means by which sensitive 
information about terrorist activities can by obtained (as evidenced by the War on 
Terror).
54
 Both of these situations of asymmetry will be examined in the following 
section, illustrating that the perceived necessity for violating IHL in asymmetrical battle 
is a major challenge to the respect of humanitarian norms in violent conflict, leading to 
issues of negative reciprocity, and subsequent issues of non-compliance.  
Combat in the Middle East 
The Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide clear illustrations of the manifestation 
of humanitarian violations by both State and non-State actors as a direct result of 
asymmetric warfare. For the technologically disadvantaged side of insurgents in Iraq, 
violations of IHL offered ways to 1) ensure survival
55
 and 2) get close enough to enemy 
US soldiers to kill them.
56
 
 Consider the practice of immersion into civilian populations. The act of taking 
advantage of protected property by positioning military equipment and troops in or near 
civilian buildings inherently caused difficulty in the principle of distinction for Coalition 
forces while also providing illegitimate shields in combat. In a direct violation of 
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Additional Protocol I,
57
 Iraqi forces misused specially protected objects such as al-
Nasiriyya Surgical Hospital, the Baghdad Red Crescent Maternity Hospital, and the 
Imam Ali and Abu Hanifa mosques for military purposes.
58
 In addition, the tactic of 
perfidious attack (ruses) including dressing as civilians in order to cause the enemy to 
lower its guard, and feigning surrender were all blatant violations practiced by Iraqi 
forces.
59
 Because non-State armed groups are most oftentimes operating within populated 
areas, and though this is in-and-of itself a direct violation of IHL, military justification for 
bypassing the legal precautions necessary to minimized risk to civilians is even 
amplified.
60
 The tactic of dressing as a civilian in order to conduct suicide bombings is a 
growing phenomenon seen not only in Iraq, but also in asymmetric conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Israel as well.
61
 Furthermore, Iraqi forces resorted to tactics intended to 
undercut the morale of the civilian population by attacking individuals directly in 




In these cases, the first principle of IHL (distinction) was blatantly violated 
because of the perceived need to disregard humanitarian norms. According to Marina 
Maittirolo, a researcher at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights, the occurrence of battle in areas largely populated by civilians is an 
increasingly frequent phenomenon of modern warfare, and only makes it harder for the 
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proper application of IHL to be implemented in combat;
63
 ultimately leading to the death 
of thousands of innocent civilians every year.  
State Power and the Global “War on Terror” 
It must be conceded that the issue of non-compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law is not only applicable to the perspectives and actions of non-State 
actors, and in many cases, it is indeed the State itself that disregards principles of IHL in 
times of armed conflict. From a historical perspective, the monopolization of violence by 
the state and its perceived role of right authority to wage war have undoubtedly played a 
fundamental role in the development and application of IHL,
64
 and the fact that only 
States have the power to participate in conventions and ratify international legislation 
gives national governments a sense of overriding authority in non-international armed 
conflicts. In many cases the State is even unwilling to actually acknowledge the existence 
of an armed group, fearing that in doing so, a level of legitimacy will be given to its 
cause.
65
 Furthermore no consensus as to the content of jus in bello currently exists, and it 
should be noted that many states are not ratifying parties to the Additional Protocols in 
IHL,
66
 which does little to ensure humanitarian norms are formally respected.  
Arguably one of the most controversial and ambiguous challenges to International 
Humanitarian Law in the 21
st
 century is the development of the so-called War on Terror 
declared by the United States government following the attacks on September 11, 2001. 
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Though the UN has generally agreed that any measure taken to combat terrorism must do 
so in accordance with international law, including the rules of IHL,
67
 in practice this is 
not always the case, and national governments, namely the US, frequently partake in 
activities strictly forbidden under IHL in the name of the allusive War on Terror. A 
desire to bypass compliance with the Geneva Conventions in this “new kind of war” 
which “places a high premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain 
information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further 
atrocities,” is illustrated in a memo to former President Bush stating that the “new 
paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy 
prisoners…”
68
 Exceptions to protection for non-State actors are advocated and applied by 
military personnel, and include “the desirability of torture and other inhumane or 
degrading treatment in order to extract crucial intelligence (e.g., waterboarding), the 
transfer of detained fighters outside the territory where they were captured [for example, 




In addition, contrary to the U.S. view, from a legal standpoint the War on Terror 
is often not actually regarded as an internationally legitimate conflict,
70
 and though the 
practice of denying the existence of an internal armed conflict is traditionally the 
mechanism by which states avoid responsibility under IHL, the US actually does the 
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opposite. Despite the fact that acts of terrorism are in fact subject to domestic law, the 
War on Terror has effectively caused states such as the US to “over classify” situations 
of violence, in order to apply IHL even where it does not apply—allowing for actions 
such as the targeted killings of “terrorists” as legitimate enemy combatants.
71
 Previous 
proponents of applying IHL in the broadest sense possible are now faced with the 
challenges this ‘overapplication’ presents in the contest of “New Wars,” as it deprives 
persons of the better protection they would benefit from under the law of peace, it is 
applied selectively, and overall it weakens “the willingness to respect IHL entirely, 
unconditionally and independently of conflicting contrary interests even in situations 
where IHL actually and uncontroversially applies.”
72
 
Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project 
Aside from direct activities which violate IHL, the problem is not aided by the 
fact that “Certain governments have also been reluctant to acknowledge the need for the 
ICRC and other components of the Movement to engage non-state armed groups on 
issues relating to their security and access to victims, as well as to disseminate IHL and 
humanitarian principles, on the grounds that the armed groups in question are ‘terrorist 
organisations’ or are otherwise outlaws.”
73
 The U.S. Supreme Court ruling of 2010 in the 
case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project upheld the USA PATRIOT Act, which bans 
any “assistance” to terrorist organizations, effectively ensuring legal grounds for the 
prosecution of anyone engaging in the promotion of humanitarian norms with groups or 
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individuals listed as terrorists.
74
 Not only does this prevent organizations from “legally” 
engaging in productive dialogue with armed non-State actors, but by listing a group as 
terrorists, their inclusion in activities such as peace negotiations, and the opportunity for 
furthering their understanding of, and compliance with IHL is completely diminished—
perhaps even prolonging violent conflict responsible for the death of innocent lives.
75
 The 
very act of labeling groups as “terrorists” is not conductive to furthering respect for 
humanitarian norms, and in the words of a former fighter, “once you are labeled a 
terrorist you act as one; once listed, ‘you are rejected’ and ‘you have nothing to lose.’”
76
 
Thus, in reality the self-serving attitude adopted by states, and method of “picking 
and choosing” when and how the rules of IHL can apply, should be regarded as one of 
the gravest threats to humanitarian norms that the world is currently facing, if for no other 
reason than the fact that it is practiced by the very States who drafted the rules of IHL in 
the first place. 
The Reciprocity Obstacle 
 The principle of reciprocity has historically functioned as a longstanding 
cornerstone to the law of war, even before IHL came into its current form of existence, 
and “Reciprocity continues to form a critical component of the law of war and structures 
both theoretical and pragmatic discourse.”
77
 But in the context of modern warfare, 
negative reciprocity, and the justification of humanitarian violations by citing an 
opposing force’s violations is commonly expressed. “There is an obvious temptation—
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and often also pressure from within the armed group or the concerned communities—to 
respond to abuses by government forces or other non-state armed actors. Responding 
with abuses of their own will merely risk an increasing spiral of violence.”
78
 
Mistreatment and/or execution or captured combatants is likely to result in abuses by the 
opposing force; and while causing belligerents to subsequently fight until death, is 
actually counterproductive in warfare. Although reciprocity is not a legal justification for 
humanitarian violations, the idea of positive reciprocity is undoubtedly a non-legal 
incentive for better respect of humanitarian norms,
79
 and should be encouraged wherever 
and whenever possible. The true challenge is making the transition from negative to 
positive reciprocity in armed conflicts, especially in an era where the realities of combat 
do little to reprimand the practice of the former.  
IV. Implications for Compliance with IHL  
Necessity for Working in the Context of the Existing Framework  
In light of these challenging developments, as previously expressed, some have 
emphasized the decreasing relevance of IHL as “treaty law may fall into desuetude when 
a change in the nature of conflict renders it ill-fitting in contemporary warfare.”
80
 In 
reality however, war has never been a clear-cut matter, and throughout history there have 
always been instances of combat that fall outside the scope of man-to-man battle in the 
field.
81
 While new technologies and unique developing patterns do have an effect on the 
way in which war is generally fought, obstacles to Just War have always been present. 
Thus, the relevance of IHL in the 21
st
 century is entirely dependent upon its perceived 
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relevance by actors involved, and subsequently their willingness to comply with its 
stipulations. Though these changes in the nature of conflict remain problematic to the 
determination and application of appropriate bodies of international law, they are not the 
sole reason for violations of IHL by both State and non-State actors party to conflict. An 
inherent issue of IHL is the fact that it seeks to operate in “an international society of 
states not willing to uphold the rule of international law,” which inhibits the very 
mechanisms already in place for successful implementation.
82
 As such, the lack of 
political will illustrated by national governments to abide by existing law is considerably 




 Certainly, the question of how to better ensure compliance with existing 
humanitarian norms by NSAs in the face of new conflicts is one argued by many 
scholars. Among a vast array of varied opinions, there is a major division between two 
approaches pitted against one another: the development of new law versus the ideal of 
self-preservation.
84
 Though there is a strong case for revising the existing legal 
framework in a way that could extend further protection to NSAs in combat from the 
stigma of domestic law, subsequently providing more concrete incentives for violent 
groups to obey international law,
85
 it is argued here that the international system is far too 
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slow and ineffective to reach a consensus anytime in the near future.
86
 Continuously 
ongoing debates in the international sphere concerning the legal definition and 
regulations of “terrorism” and “counterterrorist” approaches on a global level are an 
example of the lack of consensus, and unlikelihood of such a mandate to transpire.
87
 Even 
supplementary treaties applicable to non-international conflict, such as the Ottawa 
Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, are still only addressed to States, and are 
limited in their ability to enforce accountability.
88
 
While International Humanitarian Law does not perfectly reflect the realities of 
warfare in contemporary conflict, it is important to realize that long-standing 
humanitarian norms are not so archaic that they cannot be applied in practice. The duty of 
lawyers in any field is to interpret existing laws and employ them as best as possible to a 
present situation, and the same truism applies to non-international conflicts and IHL in 
the world today.
89
 Therefore, it is necessary to consider the ways in which IHL can and 
should be implemented given the current circumstances and available mechanisms for 
securing enhanced compliance.    
Taking Steps Towards Promoting Non-State Compliance  
Regardless of if, when, or how IHL should be revised, some key findings over the 
years have been identified as good practices to furthering compliance with existing IHL. 
Contrary to decisions made by governments such as the U.S., it is argued here that central 
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to assuring compliance with humanitarian norms by violent non-State actors is 
comprehensive, active engagement—irrespective of any criteria which might preclude a 
group from lawful interaction with State actors. Activities aiming to incorporate non-
State actors in the decision making process, which ultimately give them a sense of 
ownership and accountability for the humanitarian rules under which they must function 
during armed conflict, are crucial to the successful implementation of IHL. According to 
the Geneva Academy for International Humanitarian Law, “A variety of mechanisms 
exist for ANSAs [Armed non-State Actors] to commit to respecting international norms, 
such as unilateral declarations, special agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, 
‘Ground Rules’, Action Plans, or deeds of commitment;”
90
 and these methods must be 
unequivocally pursued by outside actors capable of helping non-State groups attain 
compliance. There are many organizations that regularly engage with armed non-State 
groups, including, but not limited to: The ICRC, Geneva Call, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; and the activities of 
each should be regarded as indispensible toward furthering compliance with IHL.  
First, it must be acknowledged that the very task of disseminating the rules of IHL 
to armed non-State actors is a challenging prerequisite for its understanding and ultimate 
application. Indeed, “an important step in enhancing compliance with international norms 
is to ensure that the relevant ANSA is aware of its obligations under international law. In 
come cases, for example, such groups have not been aware of the prohibition on child 
recruitment and the potential individual liability.”
91
 In considering a solution to this issue, 
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Marco Sassòli advocates for the negotiation of a simple, two page “code of conduct” 
specifically tailored for armed groups, helping to simplify the over 500 articles of The 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols—which are arguably far too complex for 
the purpose of furthering understanding and observance in urgent times of armed 
conflict.
92
 By giving armed groups a simple outline of the rules of IHL, the potential for 
acceptance and perceived advantages for complying are enhanced. The adoption of a 
code of conduct by an armed non-State group is evidence of its intention to  “ensure 
military discipline while respecting local culture and the civilian population, while 
remaining in compliance with international norms,”
93
 ensuring that the group assumes 
responsibility for adoption, dissemination, and implementation of applicable norms.  
In addition, non-state armed groups could be provided with advisory services by 
impartial organizations such as the ICRC in order to more fully develop comprehension 
of responsibility and accountability in warfare. While such a service currently exists for 
States, it should also be available for non-State armed groups as a tool for reducing 
violations.
94
 Moreover, providing information to military commanders rather than 
political representatives is indispensable to furthering compliance with humanitarian 
norms, as there is often disconnect between political and diplomatic relations and the 
realities of combat.
95
 Other methods include disseminating information to populations 
that are difficult to access through public broadcasts or television exposés, educating 
individuals on their rights and responsibilities under the law.
96
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A second step for furthering compliance with humanitarian norms is by engaging 
non-state actors in informal discussions and conventions. Correspondingly, it is essential 
that humanitarian groups that engage in dialogue with non-State groups are open to truly 
hearing and considering their concerns and grievances.
97
 It is unproductive to just simply 
hand over a pamphlet and expect a violent armed group to automatically adhere to the 
contents—mediation and genuine discourse are essential.
98
 Geneva Call is an impartial 
and neutral NGO that is “dedicated to engaging armed non-State actors towards 
compliance with the norms of IHL” by focusing on NSAs that operate outside effective 
State control through employing contracts called “Deeds of Commitment.”
99
 These 
treaty-like instruments, by which the armed non-State actor formally pledges to respect 
humanitarian norms is meant to mirror the texts of international treaties which these 
NSAs cannot legally sign.
100
 Areas in which Geneva Call specifically works to further the 
observance of IHL norms concern landmines, children, and gender issues. One of the 
main advantages of Geneva Call is that it is solely a humanitarian dialogue organization, 
and does not serve the purpose of providing humanitarian aid. This is a benefit because 
representatives of an organization like ICRC are often faced with the decision of giving 
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Lastly, monitoring compliance with humanitarian norms is vital. Yet, most 
verification mechanisms addressing the conduct of armed non-State rarely appear in 
multilateral treaties, and even when they do, are “weak and not applied in practice.”
102
 
While most IHL and human rights treaties only address the conduct of states, neither 
Additional Protocol II nor Common Article 3 have any provisions for regulating the 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of non-State group behaviors. It is 
therefore necessary that better mechanisms for these practices be developed. For 
example, Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment utilize a three-pronged system including: 
self-reporting, third-party monitoring, and field missions to proactively regulate 
compliance with groups who have pledged not to use anti-personnel land mines. In 
practice, 38 out of 41 signatories of the Deed of Commitment Banning AP Mines have 
succeeded to abide by their self-reporting obligation. Creating a sense of ownership and 
personal accountability is invaluable to the ultimate success of IHL, and the work of 
engagement organizations such as Geneva Call is essential to furthering compliance with 
non-State actors typically not given a voice in international discourse.  
VI. Concluding Remarks 
For as long as non-state armed groups are a reality of war, their existence and 
influence must not be ignored; nor should the paradigm that some are in inherently ‘bad’ 
restrict productive dialogue aiming to advance the effectiveness of International 
Humanitarian Law in armed conflicts. By refusing to engage these types of actors, there 
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is little to no likelihood that non-international armed conflicts will in any way be reduced 
in frequency or intensity; and in fact, both blind ignorance as well as lack of effect means 
for non-state actors to comply with IHL will only further the suffering and despair of 
innocent lives. It is a vicious cycle, and it is not one that will be easy to break without 
more respect, regard, and responsible application of International Humanitarian Law by 
the national governments that agreed to ratify the four Geneva Conventions in the first 
place. In his 2010 report, the Secretary-General of the UN urged Member States to 
“consider the potential humanitarian consequences of their legal and policy initiatives 
and to avoid introducing measures that have the effect of inhibiting humanitarian actors 
in their efforts to engage armed groups for humanitarian purposes.” Yet, as evidenced by 
the actions of States like the US in the War on Terror, the policy of national governments 
unwilling to engage with armed non-State actors is a challenge still to be overcome.   
There is now, an overtly apparent and inherent necessity for IHL to become more 
flexible in the context of contemporary conflicts, as they are only becoming more 
complicated. It is undisputed that non-State groups will continue to exert influence, and 
as former ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger has stated, "while lack of compliance of 
non-State armed groups is a very serious problem that we need to address, reinforcement 
of international law rules and mechanisms lies in the hands of States.”
103
 The lack of 
political will by powerful government and military representatives is not an excuse for 
the continued human suffering that still takes place as a result of indifference toward 
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internationally binding laws and treaties; and it is absolutely imperative that the State and 
its armed forces act in a way that exemplifies correct behavior in times of armed conflict, 
in order to encourage behaviors of positive reciprocity, if there is any hope of achieving 
compliance by violent non-state actors in the increasingly complex reality of 
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